Heart Throb

 

On the 26th February 1951 at Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland , the USAF, urgently looking for  a replacement for it's B-26 Invader aircraft; arranged a fly off that included two aircraft designed and built in foreign countries: the English Electric Canberra and the Avro CF-100 Canuck from Canada . Roland ‘Bee’ Beaumont, chief test pilot for the English Electric Company had the task of presenting the Canberra . After giving a breathtaking display which left the assembled assessors gasping; the decision was taken to accept the aircraft on the proviso that the US could procure manufacturing rights. The order for 250 license-built Canberras was subsequently awarded to the Martin Company, partly in compensation for the rejection of their XB-51 which was also an unsuccessful participant in the fly off. Beaumont flew the Canberra , WD932, to the Martin facility at Middle River and demonstrated the aircraft to 15,000 Martin employees. The Canberra was to be designated B-57.

 

The first Canberra B.2 was delivered to Martin in March 1951 and a second in August. After much testing and evaluation work, Martin suggested some modifications to the basic design. The first production B-57A rolled off the production line on the 20th July 1953 and flew at once.

 

The B-57A differed from the B.2 in having a two-man crew instead of a three. The navigator's window was deleted from the port side of the forward fuselage and on the starboard it was repositioned. The engine nacelles were slightly redesigned to accommodate the Wright YJ65-W-1 jet engines and the bomb bay was shortened. The USAF expressed disappointment in the performance of the B-57A and after eight aircraft had come off the production line it was cancelled; and a reconnaissance variant, the RB-57A,  took over the production line. Altogether 67 of these aircraft were to be produced and saw service with the USAF and Air National Guard well into the 1960s.

 

 

                                    _______________________________________

 

 

 

Over some weeks in the early summer of 1955 ten pilots converged on the Glenn Martin plant. Their reason for being there was classified at the highest level. They were to be involved in an operation, the details of which would not be declassified for another  forty-six years. Operation Heart Throb had begun.

 

The pilots were drawn from a variety of backgrounds; but all but one of them were current on the B/RB-57.  Captain Joseph A. Guthrie was a B-57B instructor pilot at Randolph Air Force Base, Texas . Captain Gerry Cooke was a B-26 and B-57B qualified bomber pilot with the 461st Bombardment Wing at Hill AFB .  Captain Lou Picciano was with the 1739th Ferrying Squadron ferrying C-119s  all over the world from Amarillo AFB. Captain Jim Bryant was a test pilot at Wright Patterson AFB. Captain Bob (Dad) Hines was at Long Beach , California with the 1738th Ferrying Squadron. Captains Ralph Finlay,  Robert Holladay, Bill Gafford and Kenneth Johnson were experienced reconnaissance pilots with the 363rd TRW at Shaw AFB. South Carolina . Captain Robert Thorne was from a B-47 wing and was the only one of the group to have no B/RB-57 or reconnaissance experience.

 

 

Operation Heart Throb was to involve the deployment of specially modified RB-57A aircraft to two bases: one in the Far East and one in Europe . Once there the pilots and aircraft would undertake high altitude photo reconnaissance flights over the Soviet Far East, China and other countries of the Soviet Bloc in Eastern Europe . Captains Guthrie, Picciano, Bryant and Hines were destined for the Far East and the remainder for Europe . The Far East contingent was to be led by Joe Guthrie and the European contingent by Bill Gafford.

 

                        ____________________________________________

 

At the Glenn L. Martin Company the pilots attended ground school learning about the configuration of the modified RB-57A.  After modification, every aircraft was flight tested with most of the tests flown by Gafford and Guthrie. Captain Thorne had to be checked out as he came to the project unfamiliar with the aircraft. The Heartthrob RB-57s were pulled from the production line and placed in a hangar on their own for modification and differed from the production aircraft in several ways. The missions were to be single pilot reconnaissance so the navigator’s  seat was removed. Most of the modifications served to lighten the aircraft and make it suitable fro very high altitude performance. All navigation equipment and armour was removed. The rotating bomb door and associated  hydraulics and racks were removed and the bomb bay skinned over. An optical viewfinder was installed and pilot intervelometer controls for the cameras, and for setting shutter speeds and time between picture exposures, thus producing the necessary picture overlap for the photo interpreters. Navigation was to be through pilotage aided by the viewfinder which looked through the nose, making positioning the aircraft on course and over targets easier. Because of the altitude the RB-57s were to operate at, a pressure suit ventilator system was installed. The recce suite installed within a pressurized camera compartment was; one T-11 vertical mapping camera, and two K-38, 36 inch focal length oblique cameras with 10 – 15% overlap.

 

Time at Martin was broken by a sojourn at Wright Patterson AFB for a refresher course in the altitude chamber and from there to the Dave Clark factory at Worcester , Massachusetts for the fitting of the MC-1 pressure suits. These were a vital part of the Heart Throb pilots equipment. The altitude at which the RB-57s were to operate was between 50,000 and 62,000 feet. At any height above 50,000 feet cabin decompression means  death. The activation of the pressure suit would sustain life until the pilot could get down to a safe altitude.

 

It was not until August, 1955 that pilots and aircraft were ready to  depart to their respective theatres of operation. It had originally been intended that the Yokota aircraft would be transported by aircraft carrier to Japan . Joe Guthrie:

 

“It seemed such an inglorious way to send an Air Force aircraft overseas. I worked with some Martin performance engineers to determine if the aircraft could be flown to Japan .  The major obstacle was the first leg from California to Hawaii -some 2300 nautical miles.  Subsequent B-57B flights to Japan would have a 3000 pound ferry tank in the bomb bay, but our modified RB-57As had the bomb bay removed and skinned over to reduce weight.  As a result--- no 3000 pound ferry tank.    But to my delight, the Martin engineers said I could make it with 2000 pounds remaining under no wind conditions.  So I took an aircraft and flew it 2300 nautical miles and sure enough I had 2000 pounds of fuel when I landed.”

 

Joe Guthrie did get permission to fly to Japan and after some persuasion MATS agreed to take responsibility for leading the flight of four RB-57s across the Pacific. Without a lead aircraft the flight could not have taken place. All that was left of the navigation equipment on board the aircraft was a radio compass. The flight for Yokota took off on August 25th from Hamilton AFB. The flight landed at Yokota on the 4th September. Having stopped at Hickham, Johnson Island , Kwajalein and Guam . The Heartthrob detachment became part of the 6021st Reconnaissance Squadron. The 6021st was a very secret unit and flew RF-86F Haymaker aircraft, RB-45s and T-33s adding, at approximately the same time as the RB-57As arrived; the unit received three RF-100A Super Sabres.

 

                        _________________________________________________

 

The European contingent was destined for Rhein-Main  AFB in West Germany and would fly the northern route via Goose Bay and  Keflavik . They had no lead aircraft; navigating by dead reckoning. By way of reassurance two coastguard vessels were stationed en route to provide ADF positions. The flight left Robins AFB on the 18th August and arrived at Rhein-Main on the 23rd, having been delayed at Keflavik due to bad weather. They became part of the 7407th Support Squadron assigned to the 7499th Support Group based at Weisbaden. In addition to  the 7407th the 7499th Support Group also included the 7405th, which flew a variety of transport in a covert role; and, shortly to be activated was the 7406th, which was to fly the C-130 equipped for elint/comint intelligence missions. The 7499th had been involved in clandestine work in Europe since the end of WW2 when they had flown the B-17 in an ELINT role. The 7407th Squadron also had a detachment at Bitburg in Germany flying the RF-100A Slick Chick over Eastern Europe .

 

                        _____________________________________________________

 

Although the pilots who had comprised the 6021st detachment at Yokota had joined the project with experience of the B-57; none of them had had any reconnaissance training. The first thing they had to do over the initial weeks in Japan was to acquire this training. For two  months Guthrie, Picciano, Bryant and Hines learned how to take pictures. Come mid November they were ready to go.

 

The European Heartthrob operations began in September. Unlike the Yokota pilots, those based in Germany had all, with the exception of Captain Robert Thorne, an experience of recce work. Thorne had to undergo special training in single pilot reconnaissance flying during the early days at Rhein-Main.

 

The first Far East overflight took place on 26th November, 1955 . Joe Guthrie was the pilot, backed up by Jim Bryant. The flight was to be staged from Chitose Air base on the northern island of Hokkaido . The aircraft and maintenance support were flown up to Chitose on the 24th November. Joe Guthrie:

 

“It was to be a complete radio silence mission.  If radio silence was broken within the first 30 minutes the back up aircraft would be launched. The mission profile was briefed to fly north from Chitose and along the eastern side of the island of Sakhalin far enough seaward and at an altitude of 100 feet to avoid radar detection.  This profile was to continue to a point abreast the northern portion of the island where the tip tanks would be jettisoned and a climb initiated to the maximum obtainable altitude.  Somewhere in the climb a 180 degree turn would be started in order to arrive over the northern tip of the island headed south at an altitude of about 55,000 feet.  At this point a reconnaissance run would be flown down the entire length of the island with specific pinpoint targets and lines.  The flight would then continue on to Hokkaido , break radio silence, and land at Chitose.  The aircraft would be refuelled and the film left in place for an immediate return to Yokota.  There, the film would be down loaded by the 548th Reccy Tech Squadron for processing and photo interpretation.

 

The day of the mission arrived and the weather was excellent.  We gathered early for the briefing. We had a controlled take-off time, so it was imperative that I get dressed and get strapped in the aircraft in time to get airborne right on time.  I went to the aircraft and completed the walk around inspection, then back inside to get suited up. “Suiting Up” was quite a task. I put on a pressure suit, an air vent suit, a padded suit, a water survival suit and a Mae West.  Looking like the Pillsbury Dough Boy and moving with the dexterity of a robot made me wonder if I could still fly the aircraft. As a result of worrying about the controlled take off time, I got dressed too early.  It did not take long for me to get way too hot, so I went outside into the frigid Hokkaido weather to cool off.  Finally, it was time to get aboard the aircraft.  With all the equipment I was wearing it took a personnel equipment technician to stuff me into the pilots seat.  Then he spent some time getting my parachute buckled and everything hooked up before checking everything out thoroughly.  At this point, for the first time in my life I really wished I were someplace else.  The feeling did not last long…as soon as I got the engines started I was raring to go.

 

We had a man in the control tower and as soon as he saw I was ready to taxi he told the tower operator to issue taxi instructions.  Two minutes before take-off time, I was cleared on the runway and cleared for take-off.

           

Exactly on time, I rolled down the runway, lifted off and took up my first heading.  I passed over the northern part of Hokkaido and was soon over the ocean east of Sakhalin flying 100 feet above the water.  However, it was not long before I ran into low clouds and I was completely IFR.  I was flying about 350K indicated and this made for a sporty ride over the ocean.  I decided I had better get a little altitude before I ended up in the drink, so I climbed to 200 feet and held that altitude the rest of the way north.  I could not see anything.  I went completely on dead reckoning.  At the appropriate time on the flight card I punched off the tips, and initiated the climb. During the time I was in the clouds I was worried that the mission would be a washout because of the weather.  But I was quickly on top of the clouds and as I gained altitude I could see that Sakhalin was completely clear the entire length of the island.  I continued my climb a little north of the island and turned back south at a little over 55,000 feet.  I had checked the cameras out previously so I was ready to start taking pictures.  Everything looked just the way it had during mission preparation and I was going great until I saw that I was too far east to photograph an airfield.  Not knowing any better, I made a 360 degree turn and picked it up.  As a result I got every target assigned—but not without consequences later.

 

There were many airports and as best as I could see plenty of MIGs on them.  Also there was no doubt that they knew I was there.  We had a warning device that told us when we were being tracked by radar.  We could discriminate between airborne and ground radars by the tone of the oral warning—a high piercing tone meant airborne radar.  I looked around a lot and changed headings when I could, but I never saw anything.  When I changed headings I would lose the airborne tone, but then it would come back.  There wasn’t much I could do but head south.  In frustration, I turned the warning device off and kept heading south. 

 

It was good to see the island of Hokkaido slip under the nose and I broke radio silence and called Chitose for landing instructions.  I made an uneventful landing and logged 4+40.  After a quick turn around and a change into a normal flight suit we returned to Yokota, landing just before dark.

 

The next day we had a debriefing with Colonel Avery.  The colonel asked Joe Bitz how I did and Joe said I got it all but that I had made a 360.  Colonel Avery turned to me and asked me if this was true. I said that it was.  I then got a lecture about all the bad things that can happen if you make 360’s and was told that it is “one pass and haul ass,” period.  So it was back to Reccy school for a week.”

 

Captain Joe Bitz was an officer in the 548th Reconnaissance Technical Squadron.

 

The operating procedures were different for the two Heartthrob detachments. The Far East missions were invariably undertaken with tip tanks; whereas in Europe this was never so. As we shall see this was to prove extremely problematic for Captain Jim Bryant  during a later overflight. In Europe when contrailing was expected the flights took off with a wingman whose responsibility it was to look out for contrails. If contrails were evident then the mission was aborted, as related by Gerry Cooke below If this was not the case then, more often than not, the wing aircraft would return to base. Occasionally, however, if all other portents were good, both aircraft would proceed to separate targets.

 

For the pilots of Heart Throb secrecy was of the utmost importance. Missions were not discussed with one another or anyone except those who needed to know. The chain of command in the European theatre of operations was from Lt. General Tunner, Commander of USAFE, through staff officer, Col. Bob Holbury to the individual pilot. From HqUSAFE  the chain upward led to the White House and Colonel Andrew Goodpaster, President Eisenhower’s aide.  In Japan the train of command led from the Commander of the Far East Air Force (FEAF) through the Commander of the 6007th Reconnaissance Group (Composite), Colonel Del Avery, and  to the individual pilots.

 

The European missions were planned in the security of HqUSAFE. Gerry Cooke:

 

“Col. Holbury assigned the targets and oversaw the route planning, including turning points, entry points and times into the block country, altitudes, photo runs, camera operations, exit points and times, in short the complete and detailed flight plan.  As I remember it each flight plan included approximately six targets, I don’t remember it being more, and it seems that one flight plan included only 4 or 5 targets.  I don’t believe film supply limited target numbers.  I seem to remember times when the cameras were left running to cover a target strip of some length.” 

 

The number of missions flown by each pilot varied; but the typical European mission began with the codeword ‘Pronto!’ Preflight preparation included fitting of the pressure suit and the pilot doing his pre-breathing of 100% oxygen. The purpose of this was to purge the blood of nitrogen; the presence of which at the very high altitudes the RB-57 was to fly could have been fatal. Meanwhile the ground crew would be getting the aircraft and camera systems ready and another pilot would check the aircraft. After climbing in to his aircraft the pilot would radio Pronto to the control tower and after that remain ‘radio silent,’ taxi and take off. This would be the last  radio transmission connected with the ‘Pronto’ flight until returning for let down. The tower would clear the taxiways and runways and Air Traffic Control would clear the departure quadrant. Gerry Cooke describes the typical mission profile:

“Applying full power to the engines; they produce a little over 7220 lbs of thrust each; he lifts off at about 100 knots after a roll of 2400 feet.  The climb is established at .74 mach achieving 6500 ft per minute initially.  About 25 minutes later he is at 45,000 feet, continuing to cruise-climb to penetration altitude.  According to plan he is ready to penetrate the mission area and seek out his target by pilotage, a technique little different than that used by Lindberg and Doolittle in the 1930s.  One reads a map and looks at the ground knowing where he is by recognizing things that look like symbols on the map.  Steering by compass computing speed by the clock over the desired ground track.  The pilot is still at full throttle where the power will remain until exit point of the overflight. The engines have been rated to exceed normal power and temperature limits, so the power is only reduced when the exhaust temperatures become dangerous.  He will continue this cruise climb method trading burned-off fuel for altitude throughout the overflight part of the  mission.

Now he turns his attention to targets.  He finds his identification point for a run on the target and places the airplane over that point on the ground-- putting the target in the cross hairs of the viewfinder.  Calculating his ground speed and drift, he sets the aircraft on course and sets up  the intervelometer as he makes his photo run over the target.  He takes anywhere from 6 to 12 photos per target depending on the target and his confidence in getting the required coverage.  In some target areas the cameras may run continuous along a desired path of coverage. 

My best recall tells me that the viewfinder looked forward 30 degrees from the vertical, and 15 degrees to the rear.  I believe it rotated 15 degrees left and right of the aircraft centerline.  These numbers may be off a bit, but serve to explain how the viewfinder was used in the operation.  At 55,000 plus feet the pilot will see a 12,000-foot runway in the middle of his viewfinder at the apparent size of his thumbnail.  At this altitude the viewfinder presents 12 miles of geography in the lens from left to right.  It’s very hard to distinguish things this small if the faceplate has fogged up.

The pilot now repeats this on each target run in his mission plan. The nature of these missions usually called for a triangular rout to be flown within the overflight area.  Two reasons for this; first banking the aircraft at these altitudes was a matter of delicate control due to the instability that comes with a lack of atmosphere; turns could cause loss of some altitude.  So 10 to 15 degrees was the maximum bank for turns.  The shallow bank produced a very slow rate of turn, which resulted in a wide circle track over the ground.  This made it necessary to plot the turns on the map in order to achieve the correct tracking on the ensuing flight leg.  One amusing serendipity emerged from this; our desired radius of turn could be plotted on the map with a 50 cent piece.   By coincidence the circumference of a 50-cent piece laid on a World Aeronautical Chart defined the correct circular track over the ground. The second advantage from the shallow bank we were told was that the steeper banks were easier to detect on radar.

At the end of about one hour in the target area the pilot is now anywhere from 62-66 thousand feet and nearing the point of exit and maybe as much as 400 NM from base.  He reduces the power control to idle setting, only the power will not reduce to idle power.  He has been running the engines at 103.5% power and above the tail pipe temperature “redline” [maximum thrust] throughout the target area, in a constant cruise climb configuration trading off the fuel consumed for altitude.  The full back idle setting will not reduce power below 98% engine thrust at this altitude.  This is characteristic of most axial flow jet engines with the power control technology extant in the early ‘50s.  At lower altitudes the power control in idle setting will produce lower idle power, but not at ultra-high altitudes. 

Because of this characteristic the pilot must plan and maneuver through his descent carefully.  There is no drag mechanism on the Heart Throb aircraft to counter the power produced at altitude in full-back power control position.  There are finger like spoilers that can be activated on the top of each wing but they are totally ineffective in rarified air.  The nose cannot be lowered too much or you will exceed the airframes mach limitation.  So high thrust slows descent and lowering the nose increases speed and exceeding mach limitation.  Old “hands” have named this situation “coffin corner,” out here in Texas there’s another saying for this kind of situation, not to use in this context.  So the descent must be started as much as 200 to 400 miles from base.

After the aircraft is in friendly airspace the pilot now gets on the radio and checks the weather to be sure he is going home or to an alternate.  Going to an alternate can be a real problem, since the pilot needs assistance with the T-1 suit and cockpit equipment, and any base other than home or another pre-planned destination would expose the security of your mission, and perhaps risk confiscation of the mission film.  About 200 NM from base you are down to 45,000 feet or lower, and aircraft and engine control return to near normal, and you are now in communications with air traffic control and base approach control. 

At this point in time the air traffic control system and Rhein-Main approach control was still in the hands of USAF military personnel.  In the coming year it would turn over to the German government.  The pilot reports in his descent with his PRONTO call sign.  Approach control identifies him and clears him to the “high cone” for a teardrop let down and hand off to GCA.  This is the procedure whether visual flight rules or instrument flight rules are in effect.  The GCA final is flown at 70-80 knots speed, over the fence and touch down, the landing roll can be as little as 1000 feet according to the pilot technique.

Taxiing to the ramp the aircrew, photo technicians and personal equipment crews meet the aircraft and do their respective post flight jobs.  The film goes under guard to the photo laboratory at Wiesbaden and the pilot is scheduled for debriefings at Hq/USAFE according to the results and outcomes of the mission.”

 

It is difficult to be accurate about the number of missions flown. The secrecy which surrounded the Heartthrob operations precluded discussion between pilots about targets and mission details. Over the forty five years since the missions took place secrecy was still considered imperative. Before the declassification of the operations in 1998; many of those who had taken part had died. For those who have survived last year was the first opportunity they had had to compare notes. Undoubtedly the passing of the years and the prolonged enforced silence has stolen many of the memories.

 

The project was over in Asia long before it was in Europe .  Joe Guthrie is clear about the fact that there were six mission launches and three airborne aborts. The backup aircraft was launched on only one abort; thus making for four productive missions before the project was closed down due to the advent of the Mig 19 in the theater of operations.

One of the aborted missions was flown by Captain Jim Bryant. It was a deep penetration mission which required the use of the tip tanks. When the tip tanks ran dry they were jettisoned. In this particular the left tank of Jim’s aircraft jettisoned, but the right did not. It hung up on the rear. Lou Picciano:

“The tank spun and lodged against the fuel vent T mast. The other tank was in the Sea of Japan . He went into a spin and when he broke the spin he exceeded the red line which pitched the airplane up into another stall and another pitchup. He finally decided to hold it in a spin until the stall speed and the red line had a wider envelope. All this time ‘other’ aircraft were proceeding to his position. I guess they thought it was one hell of an evasive maneuver. He finally got the aircraft down to a lower altitude and started SE towards home. The bird was vibrating badly. It was one of the engines so he shut it down. He didn’t know  at the time  that the violent pitchups had caused some compressor blade to shear off and come through the nacelle. Then he noticed that his right armrest had bent outward 45 degrees. Fearing that he might inadvertently eject himself he tried to put the seat pin back in. No luck. The holes were not aligned meaning the firing pin traveled closer to the charge that could blow off the seat. Then he tried to cut the hose. Steel impregnated hose. Again no luck. He knew he had to make a smooth single engine landing to preclude the seat from firing. There were never any radio transmissions on an ops mission. Another B-57 pilot would handle take off and landing instructions from the tower with an Aldus lamp. On ops and training missions our fuel would be so low that the aft center of gravity would not let the nosegear touch the ground making taxiing difficult.. Someone would meet the aircraft and get in to add weight to the nose. On actual missions that would be the backup pilot. In this case me. When I climbed into that bird I was in awe. Jim looked like he took a flight through hell.”

 

An armourer was called to secure the ejector system before the aircraft was taxied to a hardstanding and Jim could safely get out. On the following morning he received a case of Scotch for the Martin company for a job well done.

 

                        _____________________________________________

 

The six aircraft and pilots in Europe undoubtedly flew many more missions than their Asian counterparts. It is impossible to be precise; but a best general estimate would be that between September, 1955 and August, 1956, between sixteen and twenty sorties were flown. These overflights covered most of the countries in the Soviet Bloc. Without exception they were shallow penetrations. Gerry Cooke:

 

My flight planning was in the middle area of the block countries; i.e., Czechoslovakia , Hungary and the northern provinces of the former Yugoslavia .  I planned four missions in these areas around and on routes between these cities and airports; Brno , Bratislava , Budapest , Novi Sad , Belgrade , Zagreb and other targets on the route from Budapest east to the Rumanian border. 

To the best of my memory I flew two of these missions and a part of the third, possibly in January, March and August ‘56 time frame [cumulus clouds covered some of the targets.]  I can’t be sure if this occurred on mission number two or three.  I planned and attempted a fourth that was aborted due to contrails.  I have a strong feeling this 4th flight was in the summer before the Hungarian revolt.  It was the last Heart Throb mission for me. 

On this fourth mission Capt. Thorne was flying wing to check the contrailing.  If negative contrails, he was to return to base, and I would proceed.  The entry point for this mission was a peninsula on the Yugoslavian [Croatian] coast of the Adriatic just south of Trieste .  I remember this was also an exit point for an earlier mission.  Contrail formation was very strong at the entry altitude and there was no reason to believe that it might subside.    

The first mission planned for targets in and around the cities of Brataslava and Brno .  Targets were usually very large airports and industrial complexes, sometimes just a quadrant of a city or a convergence of highway and railroads.  I felt that we were trying to confirm or prove forward deployment of the USSR fighters and marshalling areas.  The city/targets that I remember most were near Budapest where I experienced the only aircraft sightings on these missions.  While making a right turn off target, below my right wing and slightly to the rear and about 5000 feet below, were two MIGs.  They resembled F86s more than Mig 15s.  I think in the debriefing we agreed they probably were Mig 17s.  They did not appear to be in position for a “zoom” maneuver.  What kind of threat they might have been I didn’t know, and don’t know today either.  I was not briefed on any likelihood of being intercepted.  At our altitudes above 50 thousand we were not concerned with a “zoom” maneuver threat from block countries.  Only the French based Canadian F86 demonstrated any ability to reach us at 50 thousand.  A few moments later two more appeared below and behind the first two.  This raised the adrenalin a bit, but somehow I didn’t feel threatened.  I continued the flight plan and they fell away out of sight” 

 

 

The Heartthrob operations in Europe were stood down after August of 1956. The probable cause of this was the increase in international tension created by the Suez Crisis of June of that year; and more importantly, the Hungarian uprising in the August to November time frame and it’s aftermath.

 

In Japan the end of the overflight operations meant the end of Heart Throb in that theatre. In 1957 Lou Picciano and Bob Hines went to Okinawa to train four Taiwanese pilots in the art of high altitude recce. They had with them two RB-57As. From Okinawa they moved to Taipei and Taoyuan  Air Base. On the third mission over Red China one of the aircraft was shot down over the Shantung Peninsula and the project was abandoned. Lou and Bob returned to Shaw AFB.

In Europe the Heartthrob aircraft and their pilots continued to fly well into 1958 and the early months of 1959. The pilots and planes deployed to other bases and took a lot of photos all over Europe and elsewhere; from Spain to Norway to Turkey and from Morocco to Egypt . They continued to fly the Heartthrob flight profiles but over friendly airspace. The advent of the U2 and the ‘Black Knight’ RB-57D placed the clandestine missions in the hands of others.

 

                        _______________________________________________

 

How do we gauge the success of the Heart Throb missions. They must be seen in the context of the military politics of the time. The belligerence of the Soviet Union , emphasized in the Berlin Crisis in 1949 and in their backing for the North Koreans had left in no doubt that the USA and it’s allies had an enemy. It was an enemy that was growing in strength and expanding it’s areas of influence. It was an enemy that possessed atomic weapons. It was also an enemy about which little was known. There was much conjecture about the disposition of it’s forces and it’s military infrastructure. Little or nothing was known about the air force and it’s defense capabilities. War between the Soviet Bloc and the US and its NATO allies was a distinct possibility in the 1950s. There were some who considered it inevitable. In the event of hostilities breaking out an air force needs to be able to define significant targets and destroy them and in the process irrevocably damage the enemy’s capability to defend itself and wage further war. Overflights of the territories of the Soviet Union and it’s allies was the means by which NATO and the Air Force Strategic Air Command obtained valuable intelligence about the communist military machine; and where to attack if and when hostilities broke out. They were nothing new. Since the end of World War 2 Strategic Air Command had been conducting clandestine overflights of enemy territory in varying degrees. In the early 1950s the RAF had been heavily involved: flying USAF RB-45C photo recce aircraft in RAF markings over specific targets in the Soviet Union .. In 1953 and 1954 RAF Canberras had been involved in a number of overflights over Soviet Bloc countries; and possibly beyond this well in to the late 1950s. Some historians have surmised that it was an RAF Canberra that took the first photos of the Kapustin Yar Soviet Missile site in the October of 1953.

When the Canberra began to be built in the USA as the B-57; it was perhaps not surprising that it should be considered, in its reconnaissance configuration; as a candidate for overflights. After all the airframe had proved itself before in this role.

 

Operation Heart Throb took place at a point in the Cold War when tensions were running high. The excursions over enemy territory were not confined to the Canberras. At the time of Heart Throb the USAF Strategic Air Command was involved in regular overflights using RB-47 Stratojets while the RAF was using De Havilland Comets and Canberras. The Heart Throb aircraft were, in the main not used for deep penetration flights. Their role was to survey the areas close to the borders where a possible Warsaw   Pact attack might come; to look for signs of a military build up and increased military activity in the city environs and airfields. The Suez Crisis and the events in Hungary would have given an extra emphasis to this surveillance work; even though the latter event was the probable cause of the close down of the overflights in Europe . Certainly the risks of a shoot down increased as the Soviets brought more sophisticated fighters into service in the satellite countries following the Hungarian uprising and the emerging political threats in other bloc countries.

 

Contributed by the author, Doug Gordon

as published in Flypast magazine.

For a full set of back issue photos and article contact

www.keypublishing.com